Mexico and the Spanish Conquest by Ross Hassig

Author:Ross Hassig [Hassig, Ross]
Language: eng
Format: epub, pdf
Publisher: University of Oklahoma Press
Published: 2014-08-04T00:00:00+00:00

CHAPTER 8

THE RETURN TO TENOCHTITLAN

After Cortés fled Tenochtitlan, the Aztecs took no action against the badly mauled Spaniards aside from sending a few reinforcements to allies near Tlaxcallan. In retrospect, a massive strike before the Spaniards could recuperate was perhaps the Aztecs’ best option. But social and political circumstances made other courses of action more appealing to them.

As we have seen, Tenochtitlan was in political turmoil as Cuitlahua became king, followed by Cuauhtemoc eighty days later, and neither king was able to consolidate his rule effectively. Smallpox raged throughout the city and the region, killing multitudes, including many kings and nobles. Attention and manpower were diverted to repairing the destruction already caused in Tenochtitlan, and the Aztecs might well have believed the Spaniards would never return—at least not until they began their depredations to the east, when it was too late.

Whatever effect this social disruption had on Aztec decision making, there were also sound strategic reasons for adopting a defensive posture. The Aztecs could muster an enormous army in and around the Valley of Mexico, but logistical constraints kept them from dispatching all but a portion of it for any appreciable distance. Thus, the force they could send to Tlaxcallan might not have been large enough to defeat the Spaniards, who were reinforced by virtually the entire adult male population of the region. Besides, any troops dispatched to Tlaxcallan would inevitably include many of the king’s noble supporters. Their absence might weaken him politically during these turbulent times and perhaps even open the city to attack in the army’s absence.

Moreover, how far and how many forces could be sent depended on their logistical support, which in enemy territory was very limited. This constraint affected the Tlaxcaltecs as well as the Aztecs, so first Cuitlahua’s and then Cuauhtemoc’s decision to remain in the Valley of Mexico was prudent. There, the military situation was reversed: remaining in Tenochtitlan meant the king had access to all his soldiers while forcing his enemies to bear the expense and manpower reductions involved in coming to him.

This decision also affected the Spaniards’ tactical capabilities, especially their use of horses and formations. The Aztecs were painfully aware of how effective the Spaniards’ defensive formations could be in open combat, so withdrawing to Tenochtitlan gave them many advantages. First, remaining in and around Tenochtitlan minimized Aztec logistical constraints and allowed them to assemble the largest feasible army, leaving the difficulties of mounting and supplying an army far from home to the Spanish forces. Second, the withdrawal allowed them to bring food into the city far more easily and cheaply than the Spaniards could supply themselves and their allies by land. Third, it gave the Aztecs much greater mobility, because their canoes enjoyed shorter interior lines of communication throughout the valley, whereas the Spaniards would be forced to march around the valley along the shore. Fourth, the Aztecs could mobilize, concentrate, and support troops by canoe at any point around the valley, leaving the Spaniards without a secure rear area and forcing them to defend themselves everywhere at once.

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